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Abstract 
 
This paper finds that a country’s affinity with a foreign country has a positive effect on 
foreign direct investment flows from it to that country, by analyzing Japanese foreign direct 
investment outflows during the period of 1995 to 2009. A rise in affinity between countries 
is thought to enhance their mutual trust and as a result lower the transaction costs of 
economic activities between them, thereby helping to promote bilateral foreign direct 
investment flows. These findings imply that a rise in affinity among countries is likely to 
facilitate international economic integration.      
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I. Introduction 
 
International economic integration, or globalization, has intensified greatly in several ways 
over the past decades. One increasingly salient dimension of this trend is foreign direct 
investment (FDI).1 The total volume of global FDI inflows has increased rapidly since the 
late 1980s especially—growing about 38 times from 55.8 billion dollars in 1985 to 2.1 
trillion dollars in 2007. FDI is widely, if not universally, assessed as providing significant 
economic benefits for the host countries, contributing to their growth through provision of 
external financing, job creation, technology transfer, etc. A number of countries have 
adopted diverse policies to attract more FDI, as an important economic development 
strategy.  
What factors determine the locations of FDI? To which countries do more FDI flow? 
This research addresses these questions as a way of identifying factors affecting the degree 
of world economic integration. The existing literature on FDI presents diverse factors as 
significant determinants of FDI location. Economic conditions in the host countries have 
been traditionally pointed to as the main factors affecting FDI flows, among them those 
related to market potential, production costs, business operation environment, etc. Host 
country political conditions have also attracted growing attention. Although this is at times 
                                                 
1 A common definition of FDI is “an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting 
interest and control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an 
enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate 
enterprise or foreign affiliate)” (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 249). 
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controversial, a good number of studies argue that certain specific political characteristics, 
such as political stability and political regime type, have significant effects on FDI inflows.  
In contrast to such studies, this paper seeks to demonstrate that psychological factors also 
affect FDI flows substantially. In particular, it argues that one country’s affinity (sense of 
closeness or the positive sentiment of its population) with another country positively 
impacts its FDI flows to that country, by analyzing the influence of Japanese affinity with 
foreign countries on Japanese FDI outflows during the years from 1995 to 2009. The 
mechanism through which affinity affects FDI flows is supposed to be as follows: a rise in 
one party’s affinity with a potential business partner is likely to increase its trust in that 
partner; this increase in trust is likely to then lower transaction costs during economic 
activities between the two parties, in turn boosting the volume of those activities. The 
findings suggest that increases in affinity among countries may facilitate world economic 
integration, or economic globalization. 
This paper is organized as follows. It first briefly reviews the literature on the 
determinants of FDI location, and then develops its main argument regarding the impact of 
affinity on FDI flows. It next discusses the research design of its empirical analysis, after 
which it reviews the results of this analysis. In the final section, it discusses the 
implications and the limitations of its findings. 
 
 
II. Affinity, trust, and transaction costs 
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Existing research on FDI has presented diverse factors as important determinants of FDI 
location. First of all, economic conditions in host countries are generally regarded as salient 
factors affecting FDI inflows to them.2 Among these conditions, market-related factors, 
especially market size, are most frequently indicated as important (e.g., [Gastanaga et al., 
1998], [Lipsey, 1999] and [Schneider and Frey, 1985]). Other host country economic 
conditions, such as labor costs, tax rates, openness, trade barriers, etc., have been widely 
studied as factors affecting FDI flows as well, although empirical findings as to their effects 
are quite inconclusive (e.g., [Asiedu, 2002], [Billington, 1999], [Blonigen, 2002], [Culem, 
1988], [Devereux and Freeman, 2007], [Edwards, 1990], [Ekholm et al., 2003], [Mudambi, 
1995], [Lunn, 1980], [Tsai, 1994] and [Wheeler and Mody, 1992]). Some political factors 
have also been analyzed by several studies, mainly in the international political economy 
field. Political instability is one such variable that many have traditionally addressed (e.g., 
[Büthe and Milner, 2008], [Li and Resnick, 2003], [Trevino et al., 2002] and [Tuman and 
Emmert, 2004]). A growing number of studies have paid attention to the effects of political 
regime type on FDI inflows as well, presenting conflicting theories and empirical findings 
on the effects of democratic and authoritarian institutions on FDI inflows (e.g., [Büthe and 
Milner, 2008], [Feng, 2001], [Jakobsen and Soysa, 2006], [Jensen, 2003], [Jessop, 1999], 
[Li and Resnick, 2003], [O’Donnell, 1978], [Oneal, 1994] and [Resnick, 2001]). 
  There could conceivably be other important FDI location determinants, however. This 
                                                 
2 For a good review of the literature on economic determinants of FDI location, see Blonigen (2005). For a 
typical economic analysis of FDI also see Dunning (1977, 1979, 1980), who has introduced the “eclectic” or 
“OLI” paradigm in analyzing FDI. 
 6
paper focuses on a psychological one, affinity, arguing that a country’s affinity with a 
foreign country positively affects its FDI flows to that country. And there are in fact a group 
of studies, especially in the international business literature, that address the impact of 
psychological factors on FDI flows (e.g., [Ghemawat, 2001], [Habib and Zurawicki, 2002], 
[Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990], [Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975], [Kogut and 
Harbir, 1988], [Li and Guisinger, 1992] and [Loree and Guisinger, 1995]).3 They examine 
“psychic distance” (the perceived distance between the home and a foreign country, 
stemming from differences in culture, economy, politics, etc), or focus more narrowly on 
“cultural distance” only. They argue that psychic or cultural distance between the home and 
a foreign country has a negative impact on FDI flows between them. These studies tend not 
to directly address psychological distance between the home and a foreign country per se, 
however, but instead indirectly consider their differences in culture, economic development, 
political system, etc. Such differences may affect psychological distance, but whether they 
necessarily always do so seems debatable. In contrast to such studies, therefore, this paper 
deals directly with the impact of psychological distance on FDI flows, by explicitly 
addressing one country’s affinity with foreign countries.  
Affinity between two countries is thought to affect FDI flows between them through the 
following mechanism. Firstly, given that social relations are primarily accountable for the 
generation of trust in economic life (Granovetter, 1985), and that affinity strengthens social 
relations by fostering a sense of closeness (Moreland and Beach, 1992), it may be 
reasonable to expect a positive relationship between one’s affinity with a counterparty and 
                                                 
3 For a review of this literature see Kirkman et al. (2006). 
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one’s trust in her or him. When one’s affinity with others increases, one’s trust in them is 
therefore also likely to grow. Conversely, when one’s feeling of closeness to others declines, 
trust in them will likely follow.4 Trust in economic relationships is a valuable asset, that 
lowers transaction costs in a number of ways. For example, where high trust between firms 
exists they will be confident of a fair division of the payoffs on their cooperative business 
activities, and feel less need for heavy investment in ex ante bargaining. Their negotiations 
may in addition be more efficient, owing to their confidence that information provided by 
their partners is not misrepresented. Ex ante contracting costs will decline as a result. Trust 
may reduce ex post contracting costs as well, as firms’ trust in their partners will lead them 
to devote fewer resources to contract monitoring and enforcement, or to ex post bargaining 
and haggling over problems emerging in the course of the actual transacting (Boersma, et 
al., 2003; Dyer and Chu, 2003). Given that transaction costs have a great impact on 
economic efficiency, their lowering can affect economic activities significantly (North, 
1990).5 Such functions of affinity in business activities may be of particular significance 
for FDI, given its objective of obtaining lasting interest, implying therewith a long-term 
relationship between the investor and the host country.   
There are indeed statistical studies whose findings support such a positive relationship 
                                                 
4 The formation of affinity may be influenced by diverse factors, such as cultural closeness, political ideology, 
economic reputation, etc. However, study of the sources of affinity is beyond the coverage of this paper, 
which focuses only on the effects of affinity on economic behavior, in particular on FDI flows.  
5 North (1990) estimates that as much as 35 to 40 percent of the costs associated with economic activities 
may be accounted for by transaction costs.  
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between trust and low transaction costs. Butter and Mosch (2003), for example, show that 
trust between trading partners significantly enhances trade by lowering transaction costs. 
Guiso et al. (2004) meanwhile demonstrate that increased trust of importers toward 
exporters boosts exports in European countries, while Dyer and Chu (2003) find an inverse 
relationship between trust and transaction costs in their analysis of supplier-automaker 
exchange relationships in the United States, Japan and South Korea. There is in addition 
empirical research finding a significant positive relationship between affinity and business 
activities. Noland (2004), for instance, shows a significant positive impact of the attitude of 
the US public toward foreign countries on the volume of US trade.  
I thus argue that a high level of affinity between two countries is likely to promote 
economic activities between them, through the channel of an increase in mutual trust and 
resulting decrease in the transaction costs of economic activities between them. This 
argument yields the following testable hypothesis regarding FDI flows, all other things 
being equal:      
 
Hypothesis: The higher a country’s affinity with a foreign country, the more likely its FDI 
is to flow to that country.  
 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
 
To test this hypothesis, I conduct a statistical analysis of Japanese FDI outflows to twelve 
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countries during the period of 1995 to 2009. The countries are Australia, China, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. They were selected based on the availability of data 
concerning Japanese affinity with them, while the period of observation was chosen in 
consideration of Japanese FDI data continuity.6   
 
Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is the volume of net Japanese FDI outflow to a country on a 
balance of payments basis, measured in millions of US dollars.7 This measure is 
compatible with the key research question of this study, which is whether a country’s 
affinity with another country promotes FDI flows from it to that country. Some studies on 
the determinants of FDI location use the ratio of FDI inflows to the host country’s GDP as 
their dependent variable (e.g., [Büthe and Milner, 2008] and [Tuman and Emmert, 2004]). 
Their reason for transforming the variable in this way is to measure the relative importance 
of the FDI inflow to the host country’s economy (Li and Resnick, 2003). This may not be 
consistent with the research question of this study, however, which concerns the level of 
                                                 
6 The Japanese FDI data used in this study does not have strict continuity before 1995, due to changes in the 
dollar conversion method used and the definition of FDI. 
7 FDI figures were first released in Japanese yen and then converted into US dollars using the Bank of Japan 
average inter-bank rates. 
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Japanese FDI outflows per se.8   
The variable is adjusted to take into account inflation by using the consumer price index, 
and is logged to deal with its skewed distribution. Data is provided by the Japan External 
Trade Organization, based upon Japanese Ministry of Finance Balance of Payments 
Statistics and Bank of Japan foreign exchange rates. In the statistical analysis, the 
dependent variable is labeled as JAPANESE FDI.  
 
Explanatory variable  
 
The explanatory variable that this research focuses on is the level of Japanese affinity with 
a foreign country. To measure this, I use as a proxy the percentage of respondents 
expressing affinity with the country in the Japanese government’s annual public opinion 
survey on Japan’s foreign relations (Kaikou-ni Kansuru Seron-chyousa).9  
The survey cited has been conducted every October since 1977, with its target 
respondents people over age 20. The size of its sample has been 3,000, and from 1999 to 
2009 the response rate ranged from about 60 to 70 percent. The survey sampling method is 
two-staged stratified random sampling. In the questionnaire, the question as to affinity with 
a foreign country has five possible responses: (i) feel affinity; (ii) if must choose, feel 
                                                 
8 In analyzing FDI inflows, Li and Resnick (2003) and Oneal (1994) also use the level of FDI inflows as their 
dependent variables, rather than such a transformed variable.  
9 The results of the survey are available on the website of the Cabinet Office of Japan (http://www.cao.go.jp), 
in Japanese only. 
 11
affinity; (iii) don’t know; (iv) if must choose, don’t feel affinity; and (v) don’t feel affinity. 
The percentage share in total respondents of the number checking either of the first two 
choices is reported as the percentage feeling affinity with the country.  
The countries that the survey covers individually are limited to China, South Korea, 
Russia, and the United States. It does cover Australia and New Zealand as well, but does 
not separately distinguish between affinities with the two countries, asking about only 
affinity with “Australia and New Zealand.” I thus allocate identically to both countries the 
reported percentage of those expressing affinity with “Australia and New Zealand.” 
Meanwhile, the survey also examines affinity with groups of countries in different regions 
in an aggregate sense, that is, affinity with “Southeast Asian countries,” “Southwest Asian 
countries,” “Western European countries,” etc. I allocate the percentage of those expressing 
affinity with “Southeast Asian countries” to Thailand and Indonesia, as they are explicitly 
cited as examples of Southeast Asian countries on the survey questionnaire. For the same 
reason, I adopt the percentage of those who show affinity with “Southwest Asian countries” 
as the measure of the Japanese affinity with India, and that of those expressing affinity with 
“Western European countries” as indicating their affinity equally with France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom.10  
                                                 
10 Since 2008, the survey has replaced the question of affinity with “Southwest Asian countries” with that of 
affinity with “India,” and that of affinity with “Western European countries” with that of affinity with 
“European countries,” citing the United Kingdom, France and Poland as examples. For consistency of data, I 
allocate the values of affinity with “European countries” for 2008 and 2009 to the United Kingdom, France 
and Germany.     
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This measurement of affinity may not be the best one. However, the fact that the 
questionnaire does not specify individual countries in those regions per se may suggest that 
Japanese affinity with a country within one region may not be substantially different from 
that with other regional countries. The affinity measure adopted here does not appear a 
serious problem, therefore, while it has the advantage of increasing the number of 
observations.  
The explanatory variable is labeled as AFFINITY, and is lagged by one year, in 
consideration of the time lag between an investment decision and the actual investment. I 
expect that the higher the Japanese affinity with a country is, the more Japanese FDI 
outflows into that country there will be. AFFINITY is accordingly expected to have a 
positive impact on JAPANESE FDI. 
  Meanwhile, it is possible that a change in affinity, rather than its level, is what affects 
Japanese FDI outflows. This possibility is unlikely to be great, though, since even when 
Japanese affinity with a foreign country rises slightly the affinity level can still be low. I do 
test this possibility in statistical analysis as well, however.  
 
Control variables  
 
The control variables include five economic variables—market size, labor cost, corporate 
tax rate, openness, and trade barriers—and two political variables—democracy and political 
stability. I select these variables because they are the ones frequently considered important 
FDI location determinants in the literature, as mentioned earlier.  
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Economic variables 
 
MARKET SIZE.    The host country’s GDP in constant (2000) US dollars is used to 
measure its market size. The variable is logged, with a one-year lag. Data is from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. Given that the literature on FDI flows generally 
finds a positive relationship between a country’s market size and the volume of FDI inflows 
to it, MARKET SIZE is expected to affect JAPANESE FDI positively. 
 
LABOR COST.    Real manufacturing wages are used as a proxy measure for labor costs. I 
estimate real annual wages converted into US dollars, using data on wages in local 
currencies obtained mainly from the United Nations’ Statistical Yearbook. The variable is 
logged, with a one-year lag. Considering that low wages may increase the profitability of 
FDI, I expect LABOR COST to show a negative relationship with JAPANESE FDI.    
 
CORPORATE TAX.    The variable is the corporate tax rate in the sample country, lagged 
by one year. Data is from KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey 2010. Given 
that a high corporate tax rate may lower an FDI firm’s income, CORPORATE TAX RATE is 
expected to affect JAPANESE FDI negatively.   
 
OPENNESS.    For the measurement of host country openness, I use the ratio of its trade to 
GDP from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, lagged by one year. As export-
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oriented FDI seems likely to prefer a more open economy, I expect a positive relationship 
between OPENESS and JAPANESE FDI.  
 
TRADE BARRIERS.    In measuring the degree of trade barriers, I use average Most 
Favored Nation-applied tariff rates as a proxy measure, lagged by one year. Data is from 
the World Bank’s Data on Trade and Import Barriers. Considering that FDI may be used as 
a means of overcoming trade barriers, TRADE BARRIERS is expected to have a positive 
impact on JAPANESE FDI.    
 
Political variables  
 
DEMOCRACY.    As the measure of a country’s level of democracy, I use the Revised 
Combined Polity Score (POLITY2) in the Polity IV dataset, widely used in political science 
research. The polity score is computed by subtracting the score for autocracy from that for 
democracy, and ranges from –10 (strong autocratic) to +10 (strong democratic). I lag the 
variable by one year. The literature contains conflicting expectations as to the impact of 
democracy on FDI inflows, with some claiming it to be positive and some the opposite. 
Empirical testing of the effect of DEMOCRACY on JAPANESE FDI is therefore done without 
expectation.        
         
POLITICAL STABILITY.    To measure political stability, I use the Cingranelli-Richards 
(CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. Although this dataset is in principle set up to provide 
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information on government respect for internationally recognized human rights, it includes 
an indicator that may be used as a proxy measure of countries’ political stability. This is the 
Physical Integrity Rights Index, an additive index constructed from indicators of torture, 
extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment and disappearance. It ranges from 0 (no 
government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for them).11 The 
variable is lagged by one year. Empirical studies of the relationship between political 
stability and FDI flows have presented mixed results. It appears theoretically more 
plausible to expect political stability to attract more FDI inflows, however, and I thus 
anticipate a positive relationship between POLITICAL STABILITY and JAPANESE FDI.   
   
Estimation method 
 
The data has a pooled time-series cross-section (TSCS) structure, characterized by 
containing repeated observations on fixed units over a relatively long period of time. Due to 
their temporal and spatial properties, TSCS data often show panel heteroscedasticity in the 
errors, contemporaneous correlation of errors, and autocorrelation of errors (Beck and Katz, 
1995).12 To deal with these problems, I run a Prais-Winsten regression adopting a common 
                                                 
11 The World Bank publishes data on Political Stability and the Absence of Violence/Terrorism in its World 
Governance Indicators, but consecutive annual data is available only from 2002. The correlation between this 
data and the CIRI Human Rights Dataset is meanwhile very high (0.90), and this study’s use of the CIRI 
Human Rights Dataset as a proxy for political stability thus appears a reasonable choice.    
12 Panel heteroscedasticity means that the variances of the error process differ across units. Contemporaneous 
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first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process with the use of panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSE), as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995). PCSE addresses the problems of 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the error terms, while the Prais-
Winsten regression takes into account the AR(1) process. The regression equation is formed 
as follows:13  
 
 
ln(FDIit) = β0 + β1[AFFINITYi(t-1)] + β2[ln(MARKET SIZE i(t-1))] + β3[ln(LABOR COST i(t-1))]  
+ β4[CORPORATE TAX i(t-1)] + β5[OPENNESS i(t-1)] + β6[TRADE BARRIERS i(t-1)]  
+ β7[DEMOCRACY i(t-1)] + β8[POLITICAL STABILITY i(t-1)] + εit, 
 
where subscripts i and t denote the FDI target country and the year, respectively.  
 
 
IV. Findings 
 
Summary statistics for the variables are reported in Table 1. Multicollinearity among 
AFFINITY and the control variables is tested by examining their variance inflation factor 
                                                                                                                                                     
correlation of errors means that the errors for one unit are correlated with the errors for other units. 
Autocorrelation of errors means that the errors for a given country are correlated with previous errors for that 
country (Beck, 2001). 
13 The estimation uses STATA 11. 
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(VIF) values. The highest VIF value is to found to be 8.41 (LABOR COST) and the mean VIF 
3.44, suggesting that problems of multicollinearity among the variables are not serious.14  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
To estimate the impact of affinity on Japanese FDI location, I specify a variety of models. 
Model 1 is this study’s standard model, while Model 2 excludes the data for the United 
States and Model 3 that for China. I do this because these two countries absorbed the 
dominant shares of total Japanese FDI outflows, potentially creating problems for test result 
reliability. Model 4 meanwhile limits the observation period to the 2000s, given that 
Japanese FDI outflows may have been abnormal during the late 1990s due to the 1997 
Asian financial crisis. Model 5, finally, uses as AFFINTIY the annual change in Japanese 
affinity with a foreign country, calculated as the percentage of respondents expressing 
affinity with the country in that year minus the same percentage the previous year, to test 
whether Japanese FDI outflows to foreign countries are affected by the changes in, rather 
than the levels of, Japanese affinity with them.  
Table 2 presents the statistical results from the five model specifications. As seen from 
the data, all models except Model 4 explain more than 90 percent of the variations in 
Japanese FDI outflows. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
                                                 
14 VIF values larger than 10 are generally regarded as showing the presence of multicollinearity.  
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AFFINITY is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and positive, as expected, in 
Model 1. A one unit change in AFFINITY in this model causes about a 4.5 percent change in 
JAPANESE FDI, with the control variables all held constant. The higher the level of Japanese 
affinity with a foreign country, the more Japanese FDI flew toward that country. The 
positive relationship between the two variables remained significant through Models 2 to 4, 
as well. Meanwhile, the results of Model 5 estimation show no significant effect of a 
change in Japanese affinity with a country on Japanese FDI outflows toward it. All of these 
statistical results offer strong support for the hypothesis.  
Meanwhile, MARKET SIZE is positive as expected and statistically significant in all five 
models, implying that a larger market size is likely to attract more FDI inflows. LABOR 
COST shows the expected negative effect on FDI flows, although its statistical significance 
is limited to two of the five models. CORPORATE TAX is also negative as expected and 
statistically significant in all models except Model 5, suggesting that a higher corporate tax 
rate is more likely to be an obstacle to FDI inflows. TRADE BARRIERS is positive as 
anticipated in all except Model 4, but statistically significant only in Model 3. OPENNESS 
shows the expected positive result, but with statistical significance only in two of the five 
models. DEMOCRACY is negative and statistically significant in all models but Model 4, 
supporting the claim that FDI favors authoritarian over democratic regimes. POLITICAL 
STABILITY meanwhile shows no statistical significance in any of the five models.  
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V. Robustness Checks 
 
To probe the soundness of the findings, I conduct a series of robustness checks of the 
Model 1 estimation results, using alternative estimation methods. Model 6 adopts a 
country-specific AR(1) process, running a Prais-Winsten regression with the use of PCSE. 
According to Beck and Katz (1995), adoption of a common rather than a country-specific 
AR(1) process is a superior method, as it is likely to lead to the standard errors estimating 
variability more accurately. It may nevertheless also be worthwhile evaluating robustness of 
the Model 1 results using the alternative assumption. Meanwhile, instead of Prais-Winsten 
regression adopting PCSE, Models 7 and 8 use the Parks method (see Parks, 1967), that is, 
feasible generalized least squares (an alternative approach for TSCS analysis)—adopting a 
common and a country-specific AR(1) process, respectively.    
Table 3 reports the estimation results for the three models, which are to a great extent 
consistent with those in Table 2. In terms of hypothesis testing for affinity and FDI flows, 
AFFINITY shows a significant positive effect on JAPANESE FDI in all three models. For 
control variables, MARKET SIZE, CORPORATE TAX, and DEMOCRACY show significant 
negative effects on JAPANESE FDI in all models as well. LABOR COST is also negative and 
statistically significant in two of the three models. Meanwhile, OPENNESS, TRADE 
BARRIERS and POLITICAL STABILITY show no significant effects on JAPANESE FDI. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
FDI is an important element in world economic integration, or economic globalization. 
Accordingly, study of the determinants of FDI location can provide helpful insight for 
understanding the factors strengthening world economic integration. In this context, this 
research has addressed the determinants of FDI location, highlighting the fact that the 
psychological factor of affinity has a significant positive relationship with FDI flows, by 
empirically analyzing Japanese FDI outflows.    
The findings imply that a rise in a country’s “soft power,” which is likely to be closely 
linked to foreigners’ affinity with that country, may help it to engage in cooperative 
economic activities with other countries more easily, intensifying its economic integration 
with them.15 It may also be reasonable to expect that a friendly and strong political 
relationship between two countries will boost their mutual affinity, and accordingly that 
development of close ties between countries in the political sphere is likely to contribute to 
their economic integration. This reasoning may be extensively applied to regional 
integration, emphasizing the importance of regional institutions that can increase political 
coherence among member countries for economic integration.  
In closing, two limitations of this research should be mentioned. One is that it does not 
provide an empirical analysis of the channel through which affinity influences FDI flows, 
                                                 
15 Soft power is the ability to get others to do what one wants through attraction rather than use of coercion or 
payment (Nye, 2004).  
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although showing a positive relationship between the two variables per se. As discussed 
earlier, however, there are empirical studies supporting this paper’s suggestion as to the 
channel through which affinity affects FDI flows. This study’s other limitation is that it 
examines the Japanese FDI case only, although this is mainly related to the availability of 
data on affinity.16 Note in addition that, as mentioned earlier, Noland (2005) also finds US 
affinity with foreign countries to have a positive effect on US trade volume, implying that 
the significant effect of affinity on economic activities may not be a phenomenon unique to 
the Japanese alone.    
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Observations Mean Standard dev. Minimum Maximum 
JAPANESE FDI  115 20.8633 1.3995 17.0516 24.4251 
AFFINITY 115 49.0557 14.7658 13 77.6 
MARKET SIZE 115 27.4440 1.3263 24.5773 30.0725 
LABOR COST 115 9.0575 1.6335 5.7851 10.8921 
CORPORATE TAX 115 33.9867 6.0478 24 59 
OPENNESS 115 54.7304 20.6590 23 125 
TRADE BARRIERS 115 8.9713 8.8254 1.4 41 
DEMOCRACY 115 6.5826 5.8279 -7 10 
POLITICAL STABILITY 115 4.5043 2.6930 0 8 
 
 
 29
Table 2. Determinants of Japanese FDI outflows, 1995-2009 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
AFFINITY 0.0454*** 0.0303** 0.0646*** 0.0594*** 0.0082 
 (0.0098) (0.0118) (0.0081) (0.0096) (0.0163) 
MARKET SIZE 0.6662*** 0.5146*** 0.7685*** 0.8361*** 0.6841*** 
 (0.0932) (0.1169) (0.0826) (0.0851) (0.1146) 
LABOR COST -0.2412 -0.1884 -0.4680*** -0.4278*** -0.0542 
 (0.1546) (0.1522) (0.1445) (0.1624) (0.1653) 
CORPORATE TAX -0.0442** -0.0447** -0.0634*** -0.0828*** -0.0301 
 (0.0209) (0.0202) (0.0189) (0.0272) (0.0263) 
OPENNESS 0.0102 0.0131** 0.0087 0.0134** 0.0080 
 (0.0063) (0.0060) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0068) 
TRADE BARRIERS 0.0150 0.0164 0.0310** -0.0092 0.0056 
 (0.0160) (0.0150) (0.0139) (0.0172) (0.0166) 
DEMOCRACY -0.0594** -0.0798*** -0.1576*** -0.0187 -0.0762*** 
 (0.0243) (0.0246) (0.0277) (0.0198) (0.0232) 
POLITICAL STABILITY 0.0400 0.0755 0.1223 -0.0273 0.1154 
 (0.0763) (0.0848) (0.0754) (0.0912) (0.0750) 
CONSTANT 3.6181 7.6535*** 3.0442* 1.1633 3.1442 
 (2.4046) (2.9494) (1.7453) (1.6393) (2.9674) 
Observations 115 102 100 83 111 
R2 0.9504 0.9518 0.9159 0.7719 0.9433 
Notes: PCSE and standard errors in parentheses. A common AR(1) correction. * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 3. Alternative Estimations of Model 1 
 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
AFFINITY 0.0472*** 0.0446*** 0.0489*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0110) (0.0114) 
MARKET SIZE 0.7283*** 0.7085*** 0.7308*** 
 (0.0904) (0.1169) (0.0968) 
LABOR COST -0.3231** -0.2073 -0.2862* 
 (0.1568) (0.1566) (0.1594) 
CORPORATE TAX -0.0444* -0.0574*** -0.0620*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0199) (0.0183) 
OPENNESS 0.0094 0.0097 0.0048 
 (0.0066) (0.0061) (0.0054) 
TRADE BARRIERS 0.0212 0.0149 0.0223 
 (0.0173) (0.0181) (0.0191) 
DEMOCRACY -0.0668** -0.0490** -0.0905*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0230) (0.0326) 
POLITICAL STABILITY 0.0582 0.0189 0.0630 
 (0.0698) (0.0789) (0.0740) 
CONSTANT 2.5157 2.6642 3.0207 
 (2.4449) (3.0222) (2.5235) 
Observations 115 115 115 
R2 0.9767 - - 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
